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1283 
PRIVACY IN SOCIAL MEDIA: TO TWEET OR NOT TO 
TWEET? 
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK 
People v. Harris1 
(decided June 30, 2012) 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
During the Occupy Wall Street movement, Malcolm Harris 
participated in a protest march on the Brooklyn Bridge.2  During this 
protest march, Harris, along with others, was arrested and charged 
with disorderly conduct for marching on the roadway of the bridge, 
as opposed to the pedestrian walkway.3  As part of the investigation, 
the District Attorney’s office sought to acquire Harris’s Twitter rec-
ords through a subpoena.4  The District Attorney’s office had reason 
to believe that the information contained in these Twitter records 
would contradict his anticipated defense at trial.5  Twitter notified 
Harris that his account had been subpoenaed.6  Harris moved to quash 
the subpoena based on the privacy rights afforded by the Fourth 
Amendment7 and the rules set forth in the Stored Communications 
Act.8  Twitter subsequently stated that it would not comply with the 
subpoena until the motion to quash was ruled on.9 
The court first addressed the issue of Harris’s standing to 
quash the subpoena in an April 2012 hearing.10  Although the issue 
 
1 949 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Crim. Ct. 2012). 
2 People v. Harris, 945 N.Y.S.2d 505, 506 (Crim. Ct. 2012). 
3 Id. (noting that Harris had the option of remaining on the pedestrian walkway and obey-
ing the law, but chose to step off onto the roadway along with other protesters). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 512. 
6 Id. at 506. 
7 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
8 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006). 
9 Harris, 945 N.Y.S.2d at 507. 
10 Id. 
1
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has not been raised in the context of social networking, courts have 
repeatedly held that a defendant does not have standing to quash a 
subpoena issued to third party banks.11  Similarly, Harris had no pro-
prietary interest in his Twitter account information or tweets.12  When 
Harris signed up to use Twitter’s services, he agreed to “grant[] a li-
cense for Twitter to use, display, and distribute the defendant’s 
Tweets to anyone and for any purpose it may have.”13  Twitter also 
explicitly informs its users that, through the default settings, tweets 
may be viewed by the entire world and that information posted may 
be used by Twitter for any reason.14  Harris did in fact have an ac-
count that allowed his tweets to be viewed publicly, and thus, was on 
notice that anyone with Internet access could view, print out, or use 
these tweets in any way.15  Without this proprietary interest, Harris 
had no standing to quash the subpoena.16 
Following this ruling, the court decided that the subpoena is-
sued to Twitter for Harris’s account and tweets was not overbroad 
and sought relevant investigatory information, and thus, it compelled 
Twitter to comply with the subpoena.17  However, Twitter then 
sought to quash the subpoena itself and once again refused to comply 
with the court order to turn over the requested information.18  In a 
June 2012 hearing, Twitter argued that the court based its conclusion 
about Harris’s lack of standing on the “Terms of Service” that was in 
effect at the time the tweets were posted.19  After the April decision 
was handed down, Twitter changed its policy to include a section 
stating “You Retain Your Right To Any Content You Submit, Post 
Or Display On Or Through The Service,”20 thus creating a proprie-
tary interest for Harris in his tweets.  Although Twitter argued that 
denying the defendant standing to quash the subpoena places a bur-
 
11 Id. at 507-08. 
12 Id. at 508. 
13 Id. (noting that the license meant the tweets were not property of the defendant). 
14 Harris, 945 N.Y.S.2d at 509-10 (“Twitter notifies its users that their Tweets, on default 
account settings, will be available for the whole world to see.  Twitter also informs its users 
that any of their information that is posted will be Twitter’s and it will use that information 
for any reason it may have.”). 
15 Id. at 510. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 512-13. 
18 Harris, 949 N.Y.S.2d at 591-92. 
19 Id. at 593. 
20 Id. (citing Twitter, Terms of Service, https://twitter.com/tos/ (last modified June 25, 
2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
2
Touro Law Review, Vol. 29 [2013], No. 4, Art. 16
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss4/16
2013] PRIVACY IN SOCIAL MEDIA 1285 
den on Twitter to comply with all subpoenas or to move to quash 
subpoenas on behalf of all defendants, the court found that every 
third party service bears this burden and an exception would not be 
made for Twitter.21  The court also refused to accept Twitter’s argu-
ment that the court should follow the holding in United States v. 
Warshak.22  In Warshak, the Court held that a person retains a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in his or her emails; however, the 
court in Harris reasoned that Warshak is distinguishable because the 
emails in Warshak were private communications, whereas the tweets 
in Harris were posted on a public forum, the Internet, and therefore 
the tweets were undeserving of the same protection.23 
The court in Harris ultimately decided that the subpoena is-
sued to Twitter complied with the statutory requirements to compel 
disclosure of both the account information and the tweets publicly 
posted from September 15, 2011 to December 30, 2011.24  On the 
other hand, the court concluded that the tweets from December 31, 
2011 could only be discovered pursuant to a warrant.25  This howev-
er, was not, and still is not, the end of the story for Harris. 
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Centuries ago, inhabitants of the United States were granted 
protections from governmental searches through the United States 
Constitution and its Fourth Amendment.  For the most part, this 
“right to privacy” only extended to the enumerated list as set out in 
the Amendment.  Electronic communications are obviously not listed 
in this amendment because when our forefathers drafted the Constitu-
tion, electronic communication was unimaginable.  Thomas Jefferson 
did not think that someday he would be able to update his Facebook 
status to “Just finished writing the first article of the Constitution! All 
right!” or that George Washington would tweet to James Madison, “I 
hope they finish this Constitution soon, I just want to be President al-
ready! #USA.”26  As the technology individuals have at their finger-
 
21 Id. 
22 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010). 
23 Harris, 949 N.Y.S.2d at 595 n.7. 
24 Id. at 598. 
25 Id.  The reasons for this distinction will be discussed later in the analysis of the federal 
statutes governing this issue.  Infra section IV. 
26 The “#” symbol is referred to as a hashtag on Twitter and is used to denote a keyword 
or phrase in a tweet.  The term or phrase that follows the hashtag can be searched on Twitter 
3
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tips today is beyond anything our founding fathers would have ever 
thought possible, statutes enacted by the legislature and judicial in-
terpretations of the Fourth Amendment are the only ways to protect 
such electronic communications. 
The government’s response to this modern-day upsurge in the 
use of technology and electronic communications was the Stored 
Communications Act (“SCA”).27  This Act provides different protec-
tions for information transmitted and stored electronically.  This dis-
tinction is determined based upon whether the information is stored 
on an electronic communication service provider or a remote compu-
ting service provider and whether the information contained is con-
tent or non-content.  These distinctions and the privacy provided will 
be discussed in length later in this case note. 
In addition to the protection the Fourth Amendment and the 
SCA provide to electronic communications, websites that provide a 
platform to relay information electronically (especially social media 
websites) often have their Terms of Use28 and Privacy Policy29 laid 
out on their website.  Twitter, for example, has both of these listed on 
its website, as well as Guidelines for Law Enforcement.30  These pol-
icies inform users as to what content and information can be provided 
to the government voluntarily, and what information requires a court 
order, such as a subpoena. 
Similar to Twitter, Facebook and MySpace are social media 
websites where people can update their statuses to share what they 
are thinking or doing, share other personal information, or upload 
photographs and videos of themselves and others.31  All three of these 
social networking sites allow users to control their privacy settings in 
order to monitor who can see certain information that they have 
shared.32  The basic assumption of these social media websites is that 
in creating an account, the user implicitly consents to sharing his in-
formation with others, regardless of the self-regulated privacy set-
 
and all other tweets using that keyword are shown.  Harris, 945 N.Y.S.2d at 506 n.1. 
27 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006). 
28 Twitter, Twitter Terms of Service, https://twitter.com/tos (last modified June 25, 2012). 
29 Twitter, Twitter Privacy Policy, https://twitter.com/privacy (last modified May 17, 
2012). 
30 Twitter Help Center, Guidelines for Law Enforcement, 
https://support.twitter.com/articles/41949-guidelines-for-law-enforcement (last visited Aug. 
8, 2012). 
31 Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 653 (Sup. Ct. 2010). 
32 Id. at 654. 
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tings.33  One court has stated that it is blatantly unreasonable for a 
person who voluntarily signed up for an account on a website, and 
voluntarily chose to post and disclose information on the site, to then 
claim that he is owed Fourth Amendment privacy protection to that 
content.34  While, centuries ago, a person may have yelled something 
out the window to someone on the street and that statement could 
have been used against the yeller by any passerby who heard it, “to-
day, the street is an online, information superhighway, and the wit-
nesses can be the third party providers like Twitter, Facebook, 
Instragram [sic], Pinterest, or the next hot social media application.”35  
Thus, whether in a street or social media context, the information has 
been disseminated to the public, which dissipates the reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy. 
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S APPLICATION TO 
REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY 
The Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.36 
In many cases involving Fourth Amendment violations, courts have 
reiterated the well-established precedent, observing that this amend-
ment was intended to protect the privacy of a person and not a 
place.37  The United States Supreme Court has established that the 
sphere of protected privacy is not all encompassing, but rather, the 
expectation of privacy must be reasonable.38  This is usually where 
 
33 Id. at 657 (“Indeed, that is the very nature and purpose of these social networking sites 
else they would cease to exist.”). 
34 Id. at 656 (“The privacy concerns are far less where the beneficiary herself chose to dis-
close the information.”) (quoting Beye v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield N.J., No. 06-5337, 
2007 WL 7393489, at *1, *2 n.3 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2007)). 
35 Harris, 949 N.Y.S.2d at 594. 
36 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
37 See Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 655; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 
(1967). 
38 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]here is a twofold requirement, first 
5
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the private-versus-public battle begins.  Is a statement made or an ac-
tion done in the public eye subject to Fourth Amendment protections? 
A pivotal case concerning the privacy afforded to electronic 
communications was addressed by the United States Supreme Court 
in Katz v. United States.39  There, federal agents had reason to believe 
the defendant was transmitting illegal gambling bets over the phone 
in a public telephone booth.40  The agents subsequently attached an 
electronic listening device to the outside of the telephone booth and 
used the information obtained to form the basis for his conviction.41  
The defendant argued that this electronic eavesdropping constituted a 
search under the Fourth Amendment and because it was done without 
a warrant, it violated his rights.42  The Court agreed.43  In this deci-
sion, the Court formulated the aforementioned mantra that “the 
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”44  The Court rea-
soned that if a person knowingly exposes something to the public, he 
is therefore abandoning any privacy right he might have otherwise re-
tained and is no longer protected by the Fourth Amendment.45  Like-
wise, absent precautions taken to preserve the reasonable expectation 
of privacy, an individual consequently forfeits this constitutional pro-
tection.46  However, as the Court also stated, not everything exposed 
to or occurring in the public is without Fourth Amendment protec-
tion.47 
In Kyllo v. United States,48 the Court resolved an issue with 
regard to more advanced forms of surveillance technology, address-
ing the Fourth Amendment implications underlying the use of a 
thermal imaging device to detect levels of heat in a private home.  
 
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that 
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ”). 
39 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
40 Id. at 348. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 353 (“The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the 
petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the tele-
phone booth and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that end did not happen 
to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance.”). 
44 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J. concurring). 
47 Id. at 351. 
48 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
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The Department of the Interior Agents were suspicious that the de-
fendant was growing marijuana in his home.49  Based on their experi-
ence and expertise, the agents knew marijuana growth in a home 
would require high-intensity lamps.50  In order to determine if such 
lamps were being used inside the defendant’s home, the agents used a 
thermal-imaging device on a public street, aimed at the private 
home.51  The device detected high heat areas of the house, which al-
lowed the agents to establish probable cause to acquire a warrant to 
enter and search the home.52  When the defendant contested the con-
stitutionality of the warrant and search in court, the Court found that 
because a thermal-imaging device is not in general public use, and 
the information obtained from the device would not have been dis-
covered by the naked eye, the use of the technology constituted a 
search and was subject to Fourth Amendment protection.53  This pro-
tection would require the agents to procure a warrant before using the 
device.54  The Court’s ruling in Kyllo was similar to that in Katz, es-
tablishing that there need not be a physical intrusion in order to con-
stitute a search that is protected by the Fourth Amendment.55 
A recent issue in regard to electronic communication is the 
legality of tracking individuals through the use of global positioning 
systems (“GPS”) on vehicles, and whether this constitutes a search 
under the Fourth Amendment.56  One might think that a person vol-
untarily thrusts their vehicle into the public eye when they drive it 
along a road, and therefore, the exterior of the car is not subject to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.57  However, is a simple visual sur-
veillance team that follows the suspect car equivalent to the infor-
mation that can be provided by around the clock monitoring through 
GPS signals? 
The landmark case involving privacy issues related to the use 
 
49 Id. at 29. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 29-30. 
52 Id. at 30. 
53 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40. 
54 Id. (noting that the warrant was only obtained after the device was used). 
55 Id. 
56 For an in depth analysis of the Fourth Amendment implications of GPS tracking devic-
es see United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) and People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195 
(N.Y. 2009). 
57 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 (quoting New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114 (1986)). 
7
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of a GPS tracking device was United States v. Jones.58  In Jones, 
agents believed that the defendant was involved in trafficking narcot-
ics.59  In order to investigate this suspicion, agents applied for a war-
rant to install a GPS device on his vehicle.60  The defendant’s vehicle 
was tracked for 28 days, which allowed the agents to collect enough 
information to indict him on drug related charges.61  However, in 
Jones, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Court’s reasoning in 
Katz that would lead one to believe that there is no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy for a car that is traveling on a public road.62  Rather, 
the Court found that installing a device that provided around the 
clock surveillance over a four-week period constituted a search.63 
Thus, courts must determine whether using modern technolo-
gy to enhance human senses during a search triggers Fourth Amend-
ment protection.  A person may choose to keep many aspects of his 
life private, such as the places frequented or the company kept.64  The 
electronic signals given off by the GPS monitor may be more intru-
sive than simply following a car (which would not require a warrant 
to be constitutional).  A surveillance team introduces inherent human 
error, such as the possibility that the team may lose track of the car’s 
location.  This is a factor that a person is deprived of when a GPS 
monitor is attached to his vehicle, and thus, privacy is decreased 
through the use of such technology. 
A Third Party Disclosure 
To ultimately determine the amount of privacy that should be 
afforded, courts need to determine the intrusiveness and general 
availability of electronic communications, and also need to consider a 
user’s voluntary disclosure to third parties during the normal use of 
 
58 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
59 Id. at 947. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 950-52 (citing Class, 475 U.S. at 114) (noting that the use of the Katz reasoning 
would mean no search occurred because an owner of a car would have no expectation of pri-
vacy when traveling on public roads, as he or she would be visible to all). 
63 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. 
64 Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  “Disclosed in [GPS] data . . . will be trips to the 
indisputably private nature of which takes little imagination to conjure: trips to the psychia-
trist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the 
criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue 
or church, the gay bar and on and on.”  Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199. 
8
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the technologies.  In United States v. Miller,65 the defendant was con-
victed of defrauding the national whiskey tax.66  For evidence to sup-
port these charges, the government subpoenaed his financial records 
from a bank.67  The Court found that these records were admissible 
and did not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights because 
he “can assert neither ownership nor possession. Instead, these are the 
business records of the banks.”68  As the Court in Miller recognized, 
the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that when in-
formation is voluntarily conveyed to a third party and the third party 
subsequently is compelled by authorities to disclose this information, 
there is no Fourth Amendment violation.69  There is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information that is voluntarily conveyed to 
a third party, such as a bank, telephone company, or host website.  
This voluntary third party disclosure to host websites was addressed 
in the New York case, Romano v. Steelcase, Inc.,70 which is dis-
cussed in greater detail later in this case note. 
B Social Media as Virtual Homes? 
Information, thoughts, photographs, and videos posted on a 
personal social media site must be stored somewhere for the user, or 
others whom the user chooses to share this information with, to ac-
cess it at the click of a mouse.  This user may believe he has a “virtu-
al home,” but in reality, his information is retained in “a block of 
computer storage that is owned by a network service provider.”71  
Because many users believe that this information is being held in 
their “virtual home,” it is a common misconception that this storage 
area should be afforded the same privacy protections that a physical 
home receives under the Fourth Amendment.72  This belief is greatly 
unrealistic because in these instances, a user’s private information 
must be sent to a third party to be held on its network server.73  The 
reality is that every status update or tweet sent to Facebook or Twit-
 
65 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
66 Id. at 436. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 440. 
69 Id. at 443. 
70 907 N.Y.S.2d 650 (Sup. Ct. 2010). 
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ter, respectively, whether posted on a public or private account, is 
never really private; all of this information must be sent to and stored 
with the third party host (in this example, Facebook and Twitter).  
The question then turns to whether users have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in their information, even though it has been shared 
with a host third party. 
Recently, there has been a surge in litigation regarding the 
privacy afforded to the perceived “virtual home.”  In In re § 2703(d) 
Order,74 the prosecution sought information regarding Twitter ac-
counts that were under investigation by the government in connection 
with Wikileaks.75  The court explicitly stated that it was “aware of no 
authority finding that an IP address shows location with precision, let 
alone provides insight into a home’s interior or user’s movements.”76  
Therefore, any “virtual home” privacy is in direct contrast with the 
privacy afforded to the actual home, as in Katz and Kyllo.77  Because 
the Twitter users voluntarily allowed Twitter to collect their IP ad-
dresses, the court held that the idea of a “virtual home” holding a pri-
vacy expectation was invalid.78 
The “virtual home” concept was further discussed in two fed-
eral cases, Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. Airport79 and Howell v. Buck-
eye Ranch,80 which resolved issues relating to the privacy afforded to 
sections of a social media account deemed “private” as opposed to 
“public.”  In Tompkins, the court stated that information that is on a 
“private” social media page “that is accessible to a selected group of 
recipients but not available for viewing by the general public, is gen-
erally not privileged, nor is it protected by common law or civil law 
notions of privacy.”81  Similarly, the court in Howell held that “rele-
vant information in the private section of a social media account is 
 
74 787 F. Supp. 2d 430 (E.D. Va. 2011). 
75 Id. at 435. 
76 Id. at 440. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 No. 10-10413, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5749, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 18, 2012). 
80 No. 11-CV-1014, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141368, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 1, 2012). 
81 Tompkins, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5749, at *4.  In the omitted footnote, the court ex-
plicitly states that it is not addressing the issue of whether there is a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in a “private” social media page consistent with the Fourth Amendment, nor 
whether a search warrant or a statutory subpoena is required to obtain the information locat-
ed on that page.  Id. n.1. 
10
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discoverable.”82  Both of these decisions included limiting dicta to the 
effect that the request for the information contained on a social media 
page cannot be overbroad and must only seek information that is rel-
evant to the ongoing case.83  Nonetheless, in essence, these cases 
opened the door for authorities to further invade the “virtual home” 
and even request information that a person made an effort to keep out 
of the public view and away from prying eyes.  However, this is not a 
free-for-all for law enforcement, as statutory provisions will guide the 
way to the proper disclosure of electronic communication. 
IV. FEDERAL APPROACH: THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT 
In 1986, the legislature enacted the SCA as part of the Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”).84  As previously 
mentioned, although the Fourth Amendment provides strong privacy 
protection for our physical homes, it does not offer the same refuge 
for our “virtual homes.”85  The SCA was enacted mainly as a gap-
filler for the areas of our electronic lives that we would like to remain 
private, but which were not offered any previous protection.86  Any-
time law enforcement officers are seeking electronic information, 
such as email, subscriber information, or any other record of a user, 
from a service provider, the officer must comply with the provisions 
set forth by the SCA.87  When looking into what the SCA does or 
does not protect, each electronic communication must be analyzed to 
see which category it falls into, which controls the applicable level of 
 
82 Howell, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141368, at *2 (citing Glazer v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. 
Co., No. 11-CV-4374, 2012 WL 11997167, at *1, *3-*4 (S.D.N.Y. April 5, 2012)). 
83 See Tompkins, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5749, at *7; Howell, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
141368, at *2-*3. 
84 See generally Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a 
Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208 (2004) (discussing the pro-
tections granted to electronic data by the SCA and the guidelines for complying with the 
Act).  The Electronic Communications Privacy Act also included the Pen/Trap Statute, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 3121-27 (2006), which “governs the interception of the noncontent associated 
with communications,” and the Wiretap Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§2510-22 (2006), which “gov-
erns the interception of communications content in transit.”  THOMAS K. CLANCY, 
CYBERCRIME AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE: MATERIALS AND CASES 257 (Lexis Nexis, 2011).  Nei-
ther of those statutes have any application to the case at hand. 
85 Kerr, supra note 84, at 1209-10 (“Although a user may think of that storage space as a 
‘virtual home,’ in fact that ‘home’ is really just a block of ones and zeroes stored somewhere 
on somebody else’s computer” and it is this transfer to a third party that removes the privacy 
right from the user’s communication.”). 
86 Id. at 1210. 
87 CLANCY, supra note 84, at 269. 
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privacy protection.88 
The amount of privacy that should be afforded to postings on 
social media sites is a topic that many professionals, scholars, and 
even judges89 have a difficult time understanding.  Because all of the 
information posted on these networking sites is a form of electronic 
communication under the SCA, it is important to first break down the 
different storage areas in which a communication may be retained,90 
and then describe the differences between content or non-content 
communication stored within a system.  An “electronic communica-
tion service” (“ECS”) is defined as “any service which provides to 
users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic commu-
nications.”91  A common example of this type of system is a comput-
er copying emails and storing them pending their delivery.92  There is 
an obvious privacy concern with this type of service in that private, 
personal emails are sent, without direction by the user, to a third party 
for temporary storage on an outside network computer.93  A “remote 
computing service” (“RCS”) is defined quite differently as “the pro-
vision to the public of computer storage or processing services by 
means of an electronic communications system.”94  In other words, a 
company may pay a public provider to have remote computers store 
or process a large amount of information that their in-house comput-
ers may not be able to retain or handle.95  Similar to an ECS, the pri-
 
88 The United States Department of Justice has identified three steps to help determine 
what is protected by the SCA. 
First, they must classify the network service provider [as ECS, RCS, or 
neither]. . . .  Next they must classify the information sought [as content 
or non-content]. . . .  Third, they must consider whether they are seeking 
to compel disclosure [through a “search warrant, a 2703(d) court order, 
or a subpoena”] or seeking to accept information disclosed voluntarily 
by the provider. 
CLANCY, supra note 84, at 272. 
89 Rabiner, Stephanie, Esq., Technologist, Do Judges Really Understand Social Media? 
http://blogs.findlaw.com/technologist/2012/05/do-judges-really-understand-social-media.html 
(last visited Aug. 8, 2012). 
90 See CLANCY, supra note 84, at 287-88 for a thorough example set forth by the Depart-
ment of Justice of the SCA classifications. 
91 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (15) (2006). 
92 Kerr, supra note 84, at 1213 (noting that the copies created by the provider may stay on 
the provider’s computer for many months, thus susceptible to privacy concerns). 
93 Id. 
94 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) (2006). 
95 Kerr, supra note 84, at 1213-14.  Non-public providers of RCS are not protected under 
the SCA.  CLANCY, supra note 84, at 273. 
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vacy concern implicated by an RCS is also that the private infor-
mation is being sent to a third party and is often retained by that third 
party for a significant amount of time.96  Content information is statu-
torily defined “with respect to any wire, oral, or electronic communi-
cation, [to] include[ ] any information concerning the substance, pur-
port, or meaning of that communication.”97  For instance, in Harris’s 
case, the actual text of the tweet would be considered content infor-
mation.98  This is information that a user chooses to write, post, and 
share with others on Twitter.99 Non-content information is classified 
as basic subscriber information, such as logs of account usage, and in 
the case of Twitter, lists of others who follow the user and in turn the 
user himself is following.100  The SCA’s statutory standards provide 
more privacy for content information than non-content information 
because the substance of an electronic communication is usually what 
a user seeks to protect. 
In order for the SCA to preserve privacy interests of custom-
ers or subscribers, the relevant part of the statute addresses the rules 
the government must follow when seeking to compel the disclosure 
of communications and records.101  Section 2703 provides in perti-
nent part as follows: 
A government entity may require the disclosure by a 
provider of electronic communication service of the 
contents of a wire or electronic communication, that is 
in electronic storage in an electronic communications 
system for one hundred and eighty days or less, only 
pursuant to a warrant issued . . . by a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction.102 
A governmental entity may require a provider of re-
 
96 Kerr, supra note 84, at 1214. 
97 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2006). 
98 Harris, 949 N.Y.S.2d at 596. 
99 Kerr, supra note 84, at 1228 (noting that the example of content used here is the body 
of an email—the actual text that someone wrote and intended to send to a specified recipi-
ent). 
100 Id. (providing another email example, additional non-content information is the “mail 
header information minus the subject line” and “lists of outgoing e-mail addresses sent from 
an account”). 
101 Id. at 1218. 
102 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006) (emphasis added) (noting that in order to obtain the con-
tents of a wire or electronic communication that has been stored in an electronic communica-
tion system for more than one hundred and eighty days, the same method as obtaining in-
formation from a remote computing service must be utilized). 
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mote computing service to disclose the contents of any 
wire or electronic communication . . . without required 
notice to the subscriber or customer, if the governmen-
tal entity obtains a warrant issued . . . by a court of 
competent jurisdiction; or with prior notice from the 
governmental entity to the subscriber or customer if 
the governmental entity uses an administrative sub-
poena . . . or obtains a court order . . . .103 
The relevant part of the SCA that governs the disclosure of non-
content records provides: 
A governmental entity may require a provider of elec-
tronic communication service or remote computing 
service to disclose a record or other information per-
taining to a subscriber to or customer of such service 
(not including the contents of the communication) only 
when the governmental entity obtains a warrant . . . 
;104 obtains a court order . . . ;105 has the consent of the 
subscriber or customer to such disclosure;106 . . . or a 
provider of electronic communication service or re-
mote computing servicer shall disclose to a govern-
mental entity the name, address, local and long dis-
tance telephone connection records, or records or 
session times and durations; length of service (includ-
ing state date) and types of service utilized; telephone 
or instrument number or other subscriber number or 
identity, including any temporarily assigned network 
address; and means and source of payment for such 
service. . . of a subscriber to or customer of such ser-
vice when the governmental entity uses an administra-
tive subpoena authorized by a Federal or State statute 
or a Federal or State grand jury or trial subpoena or 
any means available under paragraph (1).107 
The final part to the relevant statute under the SCA states the re-
quirements for the government to seek a court order to compel the 
 
103 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b) (2006). 
104 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(A) (2006). 
105 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(B) (2006). 
106 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(C) (2006). 
107 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) (2006) (emphasis added). 
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disclosure of content information.  This section provides: 
A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) 
may be issued by any court that is a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction and shall issue only if the governmen-
tal entity offers specific and articulable facts showing 
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 
contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the 
records or other information sought, are relevant and 
material to an ongoing criminal investigation.108 
To summarize these statutory provisions, the privacy protec-
tions afforded to electronic communications through the SCA have 
been described as an “upside down pyramid” and the “higher up in 
the pyramid you go, the more information the government can ob-
tain.”109 At the bottom (or the smallest part of the pyramid), the SCA 
only requires a subpoena to obtain basic subscriber information from 
a service.110  Moving up the pyramid, the next step is a § 2703(d) or-
der that allows the government to obtain non-content records.111  
Next, a subpoena, along with prior notice, allows the government ac-
cess to basic subscriber information, permanently held files, and con-
tents in temporary electronic storage for more than 180 days.112  Go-
ing even further up the pyramid is a § 2703(d) order coupled with 
prior notice, which allows the government to acquire all non-content 
records, any permanently held files, and contents in temporary elec-
tronic storage for more than 180 days.113  Finally, at the top of the 
pyramid (or the widest part), a search warrant is sufficient for the 
government to compel everything that is stored in an account.114 
Applying this understanding of the SCA to the case at hand, 
 
108 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006). 
109 Kerr, supra note 84, at 1222. 
110 Id.  This subscriber information generally includes name, address, network address, 
phone number, etc.  CLANCY, supra note 84, at 291. 
111 Kerr, supra note 84, at 1222.  The 2703(d) order requires “specific and articulable facts 
demonstrating reasonable grounds to believe that the [records] are relevant and material to 
an ongoing criminal investigation” in order to be granted.  CLANCY, supra note 84, at 291 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
112 Kerr, supra note 84, at 1222-23. 
113 Id. at 1223 (“Put another way, a 2703(d) order plus prior notice compels everything 
except contents in temporary ‘electronic storage’ 180 days or less.”). 
114 Id.  This search warrant includes disclosure of content information stored for 180 days 
or less and does not require prior notice.  CLANCY, supra note 84, at 291. 
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Twitter is mainly an ECS, but also has functions of an RCS.115  Fur-
thermore, Twitter collects and maintains non-content information, in-
cluding “IP addresses, physical locations, browser type, [and] sub-
scriber information,” as well as content information including 
tweets.116  If the District Attorney’s office had issued a search warrant 
to Twitter, the officials would have had access to all of the infor-
mation, non-content and content, stored in Harris’s account.  Howev-
er, because only a subpoena was served, the discoverable information 
was slightly limited.117 
V. THE NEW YORK APPROACH 
In accord with the lack of clear precedent in the federal 
courts, New York courts have not definitively defined the sphere of 
privacy afforded to what a person posts on their social media web-
site.118  For guidance, the courts have looked to the New York Consti-
tution, which is very similar to the United States Constitution.  Alt-
hough the textual language of the relevant section offers no greater 
protection to electronic communications than the Fourth Amendment, 
as a general rule, New York courts grant individuals greater privacy 
rights.119 
In People v. Hall,120 the court turned to federal statutes to ana-
lyze the extent of privacy protections in electronic information.121  
 
115 Harris, 949 N.Y.S.2d at 593. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 596 (noting that the tweets from December 31, 2011 required a search warrant 
for disclosure). 
118 Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 656. 
119 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1207-1208 (Read, J., dissenting) (“Interpretive review essen-
tially flows from textual differences between a provision of the State Constitution and its 
federal counterpart, and is not available here since the operative language of the Fourth 
Amendment and article I, section 12 is the same.”); Article I, section 12 of the New York 
Constitution states identical language to the Fourth Amendment and provides: 
The right of the people to be secure against unreasonable interception of 
telephone and telegraph communications shall not be violated, and ex 
parte orders or warrants shall issue only upon oath or affirmation that 
there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime may be thus 
obtained, and identifying the particular means of communication, and 
particularly describing the person or persons whose communications are 
to be intercepted and the purpose thereof. 
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. 
120 823 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Sup. Ct. 2006). 
121 Id. at 338. 
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The SCA guidelines for the government compelling disclosure of 
electronic communications apply in state courts just the same as they 
would in federal courts.  In Hall, government agents obtained cell 
phone records from T-Mobile to determine the location from which 
individual defendants had placed calls after a shooting had oc-
curred.122  The defendant sought to suppress the information received, 
arguing that the subpoena requesting the records was issued without 
probable cause and violated his constitutional rights.123  Hall conced-
ed that the government complied with the SCA guidelines requiring 
specific facts to be stated to prove the information sought was rele-
vant to an ongoing investigation, but argued that the cell phone was 
used as a tracking device, thus violating the Electronic Communica-
tion Privacy Act of 1986.124  This act provides that even though a de-
vice is not specifically created to track a person, it may be considered 
a tracking device if it is used in that manner.125  Neither the United 
States Constitution nor the New York Constitution provide a means 
to determine the protection that should be afforded to individuals, 
limiting use of this electronic device, so the court in Hall chose to 
look at the ECPA.  In turn, the court found that because the cell 
phone records were only sought to determine a general location of the 
defendants at a specified time and that this information was a product 
of normal use of the cell phone, it was not used as a “tracking de-
vice,” and thus, did not violate the ECPA.126  The court in Hall also 
discussed the third party disclosure issue and compared the records 
kept by T-Mobile during its normal course of business to that of the 
bank records in Miller and the pen register in Maryland v. Smith.127  
As a result, the New York court’s ruling in Hall was consistent with 
the federal trend of finding that an individual does not have an expec-
tation of privacy in information collected and retained by someone 
else.128 
In the next major electronic tracking case in New York State, 
People v. Weaver,129 the court explained that it was solely following 
 
122 Id. at 337. 
123 Id. at 335. 
124 Id. at 338 (“Under the ECPA the People must seek prior court approval based upon 
probable cause, before they may use a ‘tracking device.’ ”). 
125 Hall, 823 N.Y.S.2d at 339. 
126 Id. at 341. 
127 Id. at 342. 
128 Id. 
129 909 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 2009).  
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the protections afforded under the New York Constitution because 
the federal law was not definitive on the issue of electronic commu-
nications.130  Similar to the federal case on point, Jones, agents in 
Weaver placed a GPS tracking device on a vehicle and tracked it for 
65 days, eventually using the information obtained to charge the de-
fendant with two burglaries.131  The court in Weaver reasoned that, 
though GPS technology has become widespread for various uses, this 
does not mean that a person’s privacy has been virtually taken 
away.132  Ultimately, the court found that the use of the device re-
quired a warrant based on probable cause under the New York Con-
stitution, absent exigent circumstances.133  Even though this case was 
decided in New York based solely on its state constitution, the simi-
larities in the text of both the Fourth Amendment and the relevant 
section of the New York Constitution allowed this decision to lay the 
foundation for Jones, which would be heard in the federal system 
three years later. 
The first case in New York to address the privacy concerns 
raised in social media and electronic communication contexts was 
Romano v. Steelcase.134  The court’s ruling in Romano built off of the 
federal precedent established in the Second and Sixth Circuits, recog-
nizing that “[u]sers would logically lack a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in materials intended for publication or public posting.”135  In 
Romano, the plaintiff claimed that she had suffered physical and 
mental injuries, and in order to refute the actual extent of those inju-
ries, the defendants sought access to Romano’s social media ac-
counts.136  These accounts were arguably relevant because they con-
tained pictures of the plaintiff enjoying a normal and active lifestyle 
after the accident, contrary to her claims.137  The court granted per-
mission to view these profiles based on the inherent public nature of 
them and the previous voluntary disclosure of the information to the 
 
130 Id. at 1202. 
131 Id. at 1195-96. 
132 Id. at 1200 (“Here, particularly, where there was no voluntary utilization of the track-
ing technology, and the technology was surreptitiously installed, there exists no basis to find 
an expectation of privacy so diminished as to render constitutional concerns de minimis.”). 
133 Id. at 1203. 
134 907 N.Y.S.2d 650 (Sup. Ct. 2010). 
135 Id. at 656. 
136 Id. at 651. 
137 Id. at 652 (“Plaintiffs who place their physical condition in controversy, may not shield 
from disclosure material which is necessary to the defense of the action.”). 
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third party host site.138 
Most recently, the Fourth Department of the Supreme Court, 
Appellate Division addressed the privacy afforded to social media in 
Kregg v. Maldonado.139  In Kregg, the plaintiff’s son was in an acci-
dent while driving a Suzuki motorcycle.140  The defendants sought to 
have social media websites, including Facebook and MySpace, which 
maintained accounts set up by the family on behalf of the injured son, 
disclose the “entire contents” of those accounts.141  The court rea-
soned that, “[a]lthough CPLR 3101(a) provides for ‘full disclosure of 
all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an 
action,’ it is well settled that a party need not respond to discovery 
demands that are overbroad.”142  The court endeavored to prevent 
discovery from becoming a “fishing expedition” by denying the de-
fendants’ request to gain full access to individuals’ social media ac-
counts.143 
After deciding whether the electronic information at issue is 
afforded privacy protection or is discoverable, New York courts re-
quire that the discovering party obtain a subpoena to compel the pro-
duction of the discoverable material.  By court order, a party may at-
tain a subpoena duces tecum in order to compel a person or company 
to appear and produce the specific records requested.144  New York 
courts have defined the preliminary requirements to warrant an issu-
ance of this type of subpoena as: 
(1) [T]he materials are relevant and evidentiary; (2) 
the request is specific; (3) the materials are not other-
wise procurable reasonably in advance of trial by the 
exercise of due diligence; (4) the party cannot properly 
prepare for trial without such production and the in-
spection in advance of trial and the failure to obtain 
such inspection may tend unreasonably to delay the 
trial; and (5) the application is made in good faith and 
 
138 Id. at 656 (“The privacy concerns are far less where the beneficiary herself chose to 
disclose the information.”) (quoting Beye, 2007 WL 7393489 at *1, *2 n.3). 
139 951 N.Y.S.2d 301 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2012). 
140 Id. at 301-02. 
141 Id. at 302. 
142 Id. (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3101(a) (McKinney 2011)). 
143 Id. at 302 (noting that a party should not be allowed to search a person’s entire account 
in hopes that it will contain evidence relating to or rebutting the claimed injuries). 
144 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 2301 (McKinney 2011). 
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is not intended as a general “fishing expedition.”145 
As previously noted, a subpoena is only effective to gain access to 
basic subscriber information and communications that have been 
stored and designated as permanently held files.  As long as prosecu-
tors follow the specified rules set out in the statute, a user who posts 
information on a social media site that can be viewed publicly is not 
afforded an additional safe haven for privacy under the New York 
Constitution. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It is inevitable that technology is moving forward at a greater 
pace than the laws that are needed to govern its impact.  Social net-
working is on the rise not only for personal use, such as to keep in 
touch with family and friends, but also for companies to reach out to 
potential customers and consumers.  Social media sites have also be-
come an integral part of many background checks and interview pro-
cesses for new or potential employees.146  While it might be said that 
our founding fathers figuratively fought for our right to post status 
updates on Facebook and tweet whatever we choose, their fight did 
not provide an accompanying guarantee that the content would re-
main private.147  With the sole purpose of social networking sites be-
ing to share information with others, it seems almost counterintuitive 
to think that a user would believe that this information was not des-
tined for public viewing.148  Although it may seem like allowing gov-
ernment officials to have unlimited access to the information stored 
in a social media account is like allowing them to read a person’s dia-
ry, sometimes a certain amount of disclosure is necessary in order to 
assist an ongoing criminal investigation and ensure justice is served. 
As previously stated, in Harris, the court enforced the rules 
established by the SCA and in turn denied the motion to quash in part 
and granted it in part.149  Because the information sought was re-
quested through a subpoena, the stored electronic communications 
 
145 Harris, 949 N.Y.S.2d at 596. 
146 Id. at 597. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 597-98 (“What you give to the public belongs to the public.  What you keep to 
yourself belongs only to you.”). 
149 Id. at 598. 
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that were over 180 days old were appropriately compelled.150  How-
ever, a search warrant was required to lawfully obtain the one day of 
information that was sought that was less than 180 days old.151  Since 
that hearing in June, Twitter has been putting up quite a fight on be-
half of Harris’s privacy rights.  Twitter appealed the denial of the mo-
tion to quash and consequently refused to turn over the tweets that 
were lawfully subpoenaed.152  The judge handling the case threatened 
to hold Twitter in contempt if it did not turn over the records because 
Twitter’s resistance was causing undue delay in bringing the case to 
trial.153  Subsequently, Twitter moved for a stay of all proceedings 
until its appeal on the motion to quash was heard.154  The court found 
that until it came to decision on that motion, the stay was not yet in 
effect, and thus, Twitter must turn over the subpoenaed records and 
tweets in order to avoid a contempt finding that comes with a hefty 
fine.155  Twitter begrudgingly complied with the demand with a 
promise from the judge that the information would not be viewed un-
til there was a ruling on the stay.156 
In today’s techno-centric world, people should be aware that 
almost anything and everything that they say or do may be recorded 
on some medium.  No matter how hard a person may try to delete 
something, it still exists somewhere out in cyberspace and can be 
found by anyone who wants to take the time to look for it.157  So the 
next time you go to update your Twitter account, think of the poten-
tial consequences of the content you’re posting, and ask yourself, to 
tweet or not to tweet? 
 
150 Harris, 949 N.Y.S.2d at 598. 
151 Id. 
152 Andrew Keshner, D.A. Seeks to Doom Twitter’s Bid to Stay Review of Tweets, 
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 7, 2012. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Christine Simmons, Twitter Is Given a Deadline to Avoid Contempt Finding, N.Y.L.J., 
Sept. 12, 2012. 
156 Christine Simmons, Twitter Reluctantly Turns Over Documents of Occupy Protester, 
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 17, 2012. 
157 Harris, 949 N.Y.S.2d at 595 (“Even when a user deletes his or her tweets there are 
search engines available such as ‘Untweetable,’ ‘Tweleted,’ and ‘Politwoops’ that hold users 
accountable for everything they had publicly tweeted and later deleted.”). 
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